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INTRODUCTION 
Ogden Commons is a case study of a mixed-use project in North 
Lawndale, Chicago, which because of the involvement of a committed 
Housing Authority and anchor institutions as well as other regulatory 
requirements, represents the intended use of the Opportunity Zone 
(OZ) tax incentive.  Congress introduced this place-based tax 
incentive in the Tax Cut Jobs Act of 2017,1 incorporating the 
Investing in Opportunity Act that Senator Cory Booker introduced 
with Senator Tim Scott in 2016.2  The idea was to “create[] a powerful 
new tool for promoting lasting economic development in the places 
that need it most” and to “incentivize private investors to invest their 
inactive capital in high-impact projects in economically distressed 
communities.”3 
Specifically, the OZ tax incentive provides for favorable tax 
treatment of capital gains that are reinvested into qualified 
opportunity funds (QOFs),4 certain corporations or partnerships that 
then invest in Qualified Opportunity Zone property.5  Opportunity 
Zone property can be Qualified Opportunity Zone stock, Qualified 
Opportunity Zone business property, or a Qualified Opportunity 
Zone partnership interest.6  Qualified Opportunity Zones were 
designated in each state by the Treasury Department after being 
nominated by the states’ respective governors.7  The governors were 
limited to selecting a maximum of 25% of the number of low-income 
communities, generally tracts with poverty rates of at least 20% or 
median family income less than 80% of the area median, within their 
state.8 
 
 1. See Amendment of 1986 Code, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13823, 131 Stat. 2054, 
2183 (2017). 
 2. See Investing in Opportunity Act, S. 2868, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 3. The Promise of Opportunity Zones: Hearing on S. 2868 Before the J. Econ. 
Comm., 115th Cong. 35 (2018) (statement of Sen. Cory A. Booker) [hereinafter 
Booker testimony]. 
 4. See generally I.R.C. § 1400Z-2. Specifically, a taxpayer who realizes a gain 
from a sale of property and reinvests that gain in a QOF within a designated 
timeframe may defer recognition of the gain. See id. §§ 1400Z-2(a)(1), (b)(1). 
Furthermore, if a taxpayer holds the QOF investment for at least ten years, the 
taxpayer may increase the basis to the fair market value at the date of sale. See id. § 
1400Z-2(c). 
 5. See id. § 1400Z-2(d)(1). Specifically, the fund must hold at least 90% of its 
assets in such property. See id. § 1400Z-2(f). 
 6. See id. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(A). 
 7. See id. § 1400Z-1(b)(1)(A). 
 8. See id. §§ 1400Z-1(c)(1), 45D(e)(1). Low-income communities are defined 
using poverty rates and median family income, as per the New Markets Tax Credit 
2021] OGDEN COMMONS CASE STUDY 1069 
There are currently 8,764 designated Opportunity Zones 
throughout the United States and its territories,9 comprising 
approximately 12% of all U.S. census tracts.10  The number of 
designated Opportunity Zones ranges from 14 in the Virgin Islands to 
879 in California.11  “One in four Opportunity Zones have a poverty 
rate over 40 percent, compared to” 6.7% census tracts nationwide.12  
Furthermore, the median family income in an Opportunity Zone is 
37% below the state median.13  Part I of this Article describes one 
such designated Opportunity Zone in North Lawndale, Chicago, 
census tract 8433.14  With a poverty rate of 46%15 and an 
unemployment rate of 15%,16 this census tract represents the type of 
economically distressed community that Congress intended to assist 
with the OZ tax incentive. 
To learn more about this community and the Ogden Commons 
project, a list of participants to interview was developed from 
reviewing press reports regarding the Ogden Commons project as 
 
program. See The Promise of Opportunity Zones, U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM. 
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/republicans/2018/11/the-
promise-of-opportunity-zones#_edn1 [https://perma.cc/Q8BL-3LZS]. 
 9. See IRS Notice 2018-48, 2018-28 I.R.B. 9 (July 9, 2018). 
 10. See Patrick Kennedy & Harrison Wheeler, Neighborhood-Level Investment 
from the U.S. Opportunity Zone Program: Early Evidence (U.S. Cong. Joint Comm. 
on Tax’n, Working Paper, 2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
57a3c0fcd482e9189b09e101/t/607893b915858d7bd0d198ba/1618514881004/oz_kenned
y_wheeler.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NBM-8BZ9]. “Census tracts are small spatial units 
of approximately 4,000 residents . . . .” Id. at 5. There are 73,057 census tracts in the 
United States. See Tallies, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/time-series/geo/tallies.html 
[https://perma.cc/R3CC-65QL] (last visited Sept. 19, 2021). 
 11. See generally Opportunity Zones by Location, OPPORTUNITY ZONES 
DATABASE, https://opportunitydb.com/location/ [https://perma.cc/2LMD-AESR] 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2021). 
 12. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR THE WHITE HOUSE 
OPPORTUNITY AND REVITALIZATION COUNCIL 4 (2019), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/WHORC-Implementation-Plan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9L3Q-S8MB]. 
 13. See  id. 
 14. Census Tract 8433, Chicago, Illinois, OPPORTUNITY ZONES DATABASE, 
https://opportunitydb.com/zones/17031843300/ [https://perma.cc/9SPQ-29AT] (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2021). 
 15. See Survey on Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months by Sex by Age, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=%28B17001%
29&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=ACSDT5Y2017.B17001&hidePreview=false 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2021) (noting the poverty rate is 45.90% for 2017). 
 16. See American Community Survey on Employment Status, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (2017), https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=employment&g=
1400000US17031843300&tid=ACSST5Y2017.S2301&hidePreview=true (noting the 
unemployment rate is 15% for 2017). 
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well as reaching out to the Author’s network of affordable housing 
contacts.  In-depth telephone interviews with the participants were 
held from June 2020 through June 2021, with follow-up questions sent 
by email.  The interview list was expanded using a snowball sampling 
method, where at the end of each interview, each interviewee was 
asked for introductions to other participants in the Ogden Commons 
project and recommendations of other experts.17  Interviewees 
included developers, project sponsors, lawyers, investors, nonprofit 
agencies, community development institutions, city and state level 
officials’ staff, and employees of the community’s anchor institutions. 
There are very few restrictions on the OZ tax incentive except for 
the prohibition of investment in certain “sin” businesses such as 
racetracks or liquor stores.18  Investors can contribute funds of any 
amount and can pool their funds with multiple other investors.19  The 
OZ tax incentive was designed to be flexible, but this lack of 
regulation is extraordinary.  Typically, “federal programs targeting 
resources to disinvested communities have incorporated measures 
intended to ensure that residents have a voice in how resources are 
employed in their community.”20  For example, as explained in Part 
II, the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) program21 requires the 
 
 17. See Sven Berg, Snowball Sampling, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICAL 
SCIENCE 525, 529 (Samuel Kotz et al. eds., 1982); see also Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert 
F. Kelly, Using Social Science Research in Family Law Analysis and Formation: 
Problems and Prospects, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 631, 642 (1994). 
 18. The “sin” businesses that QOFs are prohibited from investing in or leasing to 
include a golf course, country club, massage parlor, hot tub facility, suntan facility, 
racetrack or other facility used for gambling, or liquor store. See I.R.C. § 
144(c)(6)(B); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(iii); 85 Fed. Reg. 1,866, 1,929–
30 (Jan. 13, 2020). 
 19. Reid S. Vardell, Note, The Land of Opportunity Zones: Deferring Taxable 
Capital Gains Through Investments in Low-Income Communities, 84 MO. L. REV. 
915, 927 (2019). 
 20. BRETT THEODOS ET AL., URB. INST., AN EARLY ASSESSMENT OF 
OPPORTUNITY ZONES FOR EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: NINE 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE USE OF THE INCENTIVE TO DATE 11 (2020) [hereinafter 
THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT], 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102348/early-assessment-of-ozs-
for-equitable-development-projects_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/83DJ-2FQV] (observing 
that the Empowerment Zones program that included “tax incentives for business 
expansion, required cities to prepare 10-year strategic revitalization plans in 
consultation with the community. The Community Development Block Grant 
program requires cities to prepare” plans that seek “participation by residents of low- 
and moderate-income neighborhoods”). 
 21. The LIHTC provides for a tax credit equal to the “applicable percentage” of 
the qualified basis of each qualified low-income building. See I.R.C. §§ 42(a)–(b). 
The tax credit functions as a supply-side subsidy for affordable housing and is the 
largest federal subsidy for affordable housing production. See Tracy A. Kaye, 
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state’s housing finance agency (HFA) to develop a qualified 
allocation plan that prioritizes certain types of projects over others,22 
based on input from the public.23 
Also as described in Part II, the developer, The Habitat Company, 
is using both qualified opportunity funds and low-income housing tax 
credits to finance the different phases of the Ogden Commons 
project, and OZ funding for the initial commercial building phase and 
LIHTCs for the subsequent residential phases of the project.  This 
unique feature of the Ogden Commons project allows for comparing 
and contrasting these very different tax incentives in Part III.  This 
comparison was the subject matter of the Fordham Urban Law 
Journal’s Symposium panel entitled A Comparative Lens: Analyzing 
Place-Based Initiatives, where this case study was first presented. 
After discussing community impact and engagement in Part IV, 
this Article concludes by observing based on this and other case 
studies, that community engagement and community benefit only 
arise when a project’s other funding sources require it or when anchor 
institutions, particularly nonprofit organizations, are involved in the 
project.  This is not satisfactory, as community engagement is 
necessary for the success of the OZ tax incentive program.  A letter 
signed by the Presidents’ Council on Impact Investing24 summarizes 
this sentiment: 
[S]uccess will require clear opportunities for community engagement 
to ensure local context and priorities are front-and-center in every 
Opportunity Zone.  Indeed, success hinges on the extent to which 
Opportunity Zones enable current residents to engage and equitably 
participate in defining how new investments ultimately reshape and 
strengthen the physical, social and economic fabric of their 
communities.25 
 
Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing Credit, 38 VILL. 
L. REV. 871, 878 (1993). 
 22. See I.R.C. § 42(m). 
 23. See, e.g., Ed Gramlich, Qualified Allocation Plan, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. 
COAL., https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/2014AG-259.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8NC-
F8BV] (last visited June 1, 2021). 
 24. The Presidents’ Council on Impact Investing includes the heads of 19 leading 
U.S. foundations, holding greater than $80 billion in combined assets, that share a 
commitment to social impact investing. See Our Partners, U.S. IMPACT INVESTING 
ALL., http://impinvalliance.org/partners [https://perma.cc/ZM7T-ETDS] (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2021). 
 25. The U.S. Impact Investing All., Government and Investors Seek to Lift 
Opportunity Zones, but Communities Will Define Success, PR NEWSWIRE (June 25, 
2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/government-and-
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Thus, requirements for community engagement and benefit must 
be made explicit as part of OZ reform legislation.  One proposal 
previously put forward involves competitively awarding grants to 
certified Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) 
and qualified nonprofit housing organizations to partner with QOFs 
on an affordable housing project or a mixed-use project such as the 
Ogden Commons project.26  CDFIs have a long history of working 
and engaging with low-income communities.27  Other scholars’ 
proposals mentioned in Part IV should also be considered, but under 
no circumstance should this tax incentive be continued without 
serious reforms. Unfortunately, the legislation currently proposed in 
Congress is focusing predominantly on reporting requirements to 
assess the impact of designation as an Opportunity Zone rather than 
mandating community engagement or community impact.28 
I. THE OGDEN COMMONS PROJECT 
A. North Lawndale Neighborhood, Chicago 
Understanding the Ogden Commons project requires situating it in 
the context of the larger North Lawndale community located on 




 26. See Michelle D. Layser et al., Mitigating Housing Instability During a 
Pandemic, 99 OR. L. REV. 445, 513–14 (2021); see also infra notes 216–18 and 
accompanying text. 
 27. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 35 (noting that CDFIs 
“have a long track record of making substantial investments in low-income 
communities”). 
 28. See, e.g., Improving and Reinstating the Monitoring, Prevention, 
Accountability, Certification, and Transparency Provisions of Opportunity Zones 
(IMPACT Act), S. 2994, 116th Cong. (2019) (expanding reporting requirements and 
impact tracking for OZ’s across the country); S. 1344, 116th Cong. (2019) (requiring 
Treasury to collect data and issue a report on the OZ tax incentives). But see 
Community Development in Opportunity Zones Act of 2020, H.R. 7262, 116th Cong. 
(2020) (allowing qualified opportunity funds to invest in community development 
financial institutions); see also Opportunity Zone Reporting and Reform Act, S. 
2787, 116th Cong. (2019) (imposing certain use restrictions on OZ incentives such as 
requiring housing projects to incorporate certain rent and income limits in addition to 
requiring the reporting of the impact of a designated opportunity zone in relation to 
jobs, business, housing costs, and income distribution). 
 29. See N. LAWNDALE CMTY. COORDINATING COUNCIL, NORTH LAWNDALE: THE 
NEXT CHAPTER 1 (2018) [hereinafter QUALITY-OF-LIFE PLAN 2018], 
https://nlcccplanning.org/home-3/north-lawndale-the-next-chapter-quality-of-life-
plan/ [https://perma.cc/GK27-XC4X] (“This is a primarily African-American 
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median household income of $28,327 (less than half that of the city of 
Chicago),30 that has seen a 19% decrease in population since 2000,31 it 
is exactly the type of community that Opportunity Zone investment is 
supposed to target.  Racially discriminatory real estate practices since 
the 1960s led to disinvestment such that “[t]he population is about a 
third of where it was at the height, and storefronts and homes have 
been demolished or abandoned.”32  In 1960, North Lawndale had 
over 125,000 residents, whereas by 2018 the population had shrunk to 
approximately 35,000.33  With a high unemployment rate of 15.9%,34 a 
high percentage of renters35 almost half of whom are housing cost 
burdened,36 and only 14% of the residents having attained a 
bachelor’s degree or higher,37 this neighborhood is suffering. 
Nevertheless, this community has a lot to offer.38  There are 
“beautiful greystones and other historic buildings, wide boulevards 
and the 218-acre Douglas Park.”39  North Lawndale is close to 
transportation, downtown Chicago, and the University of Illinois at 
 
community, and it has been since the 1960s, when families relocated to North 
Lawndale during the Great Migration.”). 
 30. See CHI. METRO. AGENCY FOR PLAN., NORTH LAWNDALE: COMMUNITY DATA 
SNAPSHOT CHICAGO COMMUNITY AREA SERIES JUNE 2021 RELEASE 3, 5 (2021) 
[hereinafter CMTY. DATA SNAPSHOT: NORTH LAWNDALE], 
https://www.cmap.illinois.gov/documents/10180/126764/North+Lawndale.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6VS4-W6MC] (in 2018 dollars). These snapshots are “a series of 
data profiles for every county, municipality, and Chicago Community Area” that 
“primarily feature data from the [2014–2018] American Community Survey (ACS) 
five-year estimates, although other data” comes from multiple sources “includ[ing] 
the U.S. Census Bureau, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA), Illinois 
Department of Employment Security (IDES), Illinois Department of Revenue 
(IDR) . . . and [the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning] itself.” Id. at 2. 
 31. See id. at 3. 
 32. QUALITY-OF-LIFE PLAN 2018, supra note 29, at 1 (“Several of our schools 
have been shuttered, and too many families live in poverty or are affected by violence 
and crime.”). 
 33. See id. at 3. 
 34. See CMTY. DATA SNAPSHOT: NORTH LAWNDALE, supra note 30, at 9. 
 35. See id. at 6 (76% with 11,075 occupied housing units, 8,350 of which are 
renter-occupied). 
 36. See American Community Survey Tenure by Housing Costs as a Percentage 
of Income in the Past 12 Months, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2017), 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=B25106&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=ACS
DT5Y2017.B25106&hidePreview=false. 
 37. See CMTY. DATA SNAPSHOT: NORTH LAWNDALE, supra note 30, at 4. 
 38. See QUALITY-OF-LIFE PLAN 2018, supra note 29, at 1 (“From a base for the 
northern civil rights movement to a hub of industry, North Lawndale is a culturally 
rich community area with unique architectural character and historic significance. We 
have a strong sense of community and an abundance of local leaders.”). 
 39. Id. 
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Chicago.40  It is part of the INVEST South/West, “a community 
improvement initiative under Mayor Lori E. Lightfoot to marshal the 
resources of multiple City departments, community organizations, 
and corporate and philanthropic partners toward 10 communities on 
Chicago’s South and West Sides.”41 
The community is also home to two anchor institutions that made 
this redevelopment possible, the nonprofit Mount Sinai Hospital42 
and the Cinespace Film Production Studio.43  As part of the Sinai 
Health System, Mount Sinai Hospital prides itself with “over a 
century caring for people living in the most underserved communities 
on Chicago’s West and Southwest sides, many disproportionately 
affected by illness, poverty and other social challenges.”44  The 11-
acre mixed-use development known as Ogden Commons resulted 
from a partnership of these anchor institutions, the Chicago Housing 
Authority, and a developer called The Habitat Company, as well as 
the involvement of PNC bank.45 
 
 40. See id. 
 41. CITY OF CHI. DEP’T. OF HOUS., 2021 QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN 18 (2021), 
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/doh/qap/qap_2021/QAP_May_24_20
21.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M5K-TGA3]. 
 42. Mount Sinai Hospital (MSH) is a nonprofit hospital, part of the Sinai Health 
System, located on Chicago’s West Side that “provides an array of medical, surgical, 
pharmaceutical, behavioral health, and diagnostic services. MSH is a level 1 trauma 
center and provides care to 44,000 emergency department and 2,400 trauma patients 
annually.” SINAI URB. HEALTH INST.  MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL 2019 COMMUNITY 
HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENT 4 (2019) [hereinafter SINAI 2019 CHNA], 
https://www.sinaichicago.org/en/community-health-needs-assessments-chna-and-
community-health-improvement-plan-chip/ [https://perma.cc/BKN5-6NMR] (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2021). “The SHS service area largely comprises communities of color 
that face historic disinvestment and marginalization, oftentimes due to racist policies 
and practices. This history has resulted in staggering differences in health between 
the communities we serve and our well-resourced neighbors.” Id. at 1. 
 43. The Cinespace produces TV shows such as Chicago Med, Chicago Fire, and 
Empire. See CINESPACE CHI. FILM STUDIOS, 
https://www.chicagofilmstudios.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/UCE8-D7E2] (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2021); see also CINESPACE CHI. FILM STUDIOS, 
https://www.chicagofilmstudios.com/credits [https://perma.cc/H5LV-LYS3]. “As part 
of its proposal, Habitat is partnering with SHS and Cinespace, two leading 
stakeholders and property owners in the community.” Minutes of the Regular 
Meeting of the Commissioners of the Chicago Housing Authority, Item 14 (June 20, 
2017) (on file with author) [hereinafter CHA Minutes 2017]. 
 44. Press Release, Sinai Health Sys., Sinai Health System Receives $7 Million 
From CARES Act for Ambulatory Surgery Center at Ogden Commons (June 18, 
2020) [hereinafter SHS Press Release] (quoting Karen Teitelbaum, President and 
CEO of Sinai Health System). 
 45. See CHA Minutes 2017, supra note 43 (noting that “[t]he resolution for Item 
14 approves the selection of The Habitat Company LLC, Sinai Health System (SHS) 
and Cinespace Chicago Film Studios (Cinespace) as the development team for the 
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B. OZ Census Tract 8433 
The Ogden Commons project is located in OZ census tract 8433 in 
Cook County, Illinois, one of 181 Opportunity Zones in this county.46  
This census tract includes a high concentration of Black and Latinx 
residents,47 a high poverty rate of about 46%,48 and a high 
unemployment rate of 15%,49 as well as a high percentage of renters 
who are housing cost burdened.50  Exactly the type of statistics that 
 
redevelopment of Lawndale Complex and Ogden Courts East; and approves a 
Redevelopment Agreement for Lawndale Complex and Ogden Courts East”); see 
also Sibley Fleming, Can Affordable Projects Fill the Gaps with OZ Funds?, MULTI-
HOUS. NEWS (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.multihousingnews.com/post/can-
affordable-projects-fill-the-gaps-with-oz-funds/ [https://perma.cc/6KRU-G6LK] 
(“The financing was executed through PNC Bank, which provided the first mortgage, 
as well as access to its large Opportunity Zone fund.”). As an aside, in 1987 Judge 
Aspen appointed The Habitat Company, a private real estate firm, as the “receiver to 
take over the development of all new family public housing units” as part of the 
judgment in the landmark Gautreaux case, which alleged that the Chicago Housing 
Authority’s site and tenant selection was racially discriminatory. William P. Wilen & 
Wendy L. Stasell, Gautreaux and Chicago’s Public Housing Crisis: 
The Conflict Between Achieving Integration and Providing Decent Housing for Very 
Low-Income African Americans, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 117, 125 (2000). 
 46. See List of Illinois Opportunity Zones & OZ Funds, OPPORTUNITY ZONES 
DATABASE, https://opportunitydb.com/location/illinois/cook/ [https://perma.cc/9NMJ-
5DMU] (last visited May 27, 2021); see also Census Tract 8433, Chicago, Illinois, 
supra note 14. 
 47. See American Community Survey on Race, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=B02001&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=ACS
DT5Y2017.B02001&hidePreview=false (last visited Sept. 19, 2021) (listing the 
minority population (non-white) is 64.93% and, of the 2,144 residents, 1,184 identify 
as Black). 
 48. See American Community Survey on Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months by 
Sex by Age, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/
table?q=%28B17001%29&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=ACSDT5Y2017.B17001
&hidePreview=false (finding the poverty rate is 45.90% for 2017) (last visited Sept. 
19, 2021). 
 49. See American Community Survey on Employment Status, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=employment&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=
ACSST5Y2017.S2301&hidePreview=false (last visited Sept. 19, 2021) (listing an 
unemployment rate of 15% for 2017). 
 50. See American Community Survey on Tenure, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=B25003&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=ACS
DT5Y2017.B25003&hidePreview=false (last visited Sept. 19, 2021) (finding 
approximately 75% of the units are renter occupied); see also American Community 
Survey on Tenure by Housing Costs as a Percentage of Household Income in the Past 
12 Months, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, , https://data.census.gov/cedsci/
table?q=B25106&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=ACSDT5Y2017.B25106&hidePrev
iew=false (last visited Sept. 19, 2021) (finding approximately 46% of these renters are 
housing cost burdened (rents greater than 30% of their income)). 
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demonstrate a need for investment in this census tract.51  The median 
household income for this census tract was $47,82952 and the per 
capita income was $14,140.53  The median household income for this 
census tract was $50,48654 and the per capita income was $18,222.55  
These statistics compare unfavorably to $62,843  median income and 
$34,103 per capita income across the United States in 2019 and 
$58,247 and $37,103 respectively in Chicago.56 
On February 17, 2017, the Chicago Housing Authority issued an 
Opportunity Notice of Proposal for a mixed-use and mixed-income 
development of approximately six acres of land located at 1401 South 
Washtenaw, 2600 West Ogden Ave, and 1321 South Washtenaw.57  A 
three-member team evaluated the five proposals received and 
recommended the Ogden Commons development proposal submitted 
by The Habitat Company LLC, Sinai Health System (SHS) and 
 
 51. However, there is longstanding debate over the “tension between providing 
adequate housing for very low-income African Americans and the ideal of 
integrating them into white communities.” Wilen & Stasell, supra note 45, at 117. 
Chicago is at the forefront of this debate with respect to the future development of 
three of its former public housing developments (Henry Horner, Cabrini-Green and 
ABLA). See id. at 118. This is evidenced by the entanglement of the Horner, Cabrini, 
and ABLA lawsuits with the desegregation case of Gautreaux v. Chicago Public 
Housing Authority, which places restrictions on public housing built in communities 
with substantial Black populations. See id. at 119, 123. 
 52. See American Community Survey on Median Household Income in the Past 
12 Months (In 2017 Inflation-Adjusted Dollars), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=%28B19013%29&g=1400000US17031843300&
tid=ACSDT5Y2017.B19013&hidePreview=false (last visited Sept. 19, 2021). 
 53. See American Community Survey on Per Capita Income in the Past 12 
Months (In 2017 Inflation-Adjusted Dollars), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=%28B19301%29&g=1400000US17031843300&
tid=ACSDT5Y2017.B19301&hidePreview=false (last visited Sept. 19, 2021). 
 54. See American Community Survey on Median Household Income in the Past 
12 Months (In 2019 Inflation-Adjusted Dollars), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=%28B19013%29&g=0100000US_1400000US1
7031843300&tid=ACSDT5Y2019.B19013&hidePreview=true (last visited Sept. 19, 
2021). 
 55. See American Community Survey On Per Capita Income in the Past 12 
Months (In 2019 Inflation-Adjusted Dollars), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=%28B19301%29&g=0100000US_1400000US1
7031843300&tid=ACSDT5Y2019.B19301&hidePreview=true (last visited Sept. 19, 
2021). 
 56. See American Community Survey QuickFacts for Chicago City, Illinois, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/chicagocityillinois/
INC110219#INC110219 [https://perma.cc/A5SZ-HY4Q] (last visited Aug. 23, 2021). 
 57. See Contract for Redevelopment of Ogden Courts East and Lawndale 
Complex 1 (Sept. 14, 2018) (on file with author) [hereinafter Redevelopment 
Contract]. 
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Cinespace Chicago Film Studios.58  The Chicago Housing Authority 
and Ogden Commons JV LLC, basically Habitat, Mount Sinai, and 
Cinespace, entered into a redevelopment agreement on September 
14, 2018.59  “Together, SHS and Cinespace are adding an additional 
5.5 acres of adjacent land to the redevelopment target area.”60  So, by 
the very nature of this partnership, the community was involved in 
this redevelopment plan even though the OZ legislation requires no 
such community engagement.61  The Chicago Housing Authority’s 
proposal process also subjected the Ogden Commons development 
proposal to a competitive screening not required by the OZ tax 
incentive.  Partnership with the Chicago Housing Authority triggered 
other obligations and mandated various approvals by the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).62 
Note that this development project was initiated even before the 
OZ tax incentive came into law.63  The West Baltimore case study 
 
 58. See id.; CHA Minutes 2017, supra note 43 (“RESOLUTION NO. 2017-CHA-
73 WHEREAS, the Board of Commissioners has reviewed the Board Letter dated 
June 20, 2017 entitled ‘Authorization to 1) Approve The Habitat Company LLC, 
Sinai Health System and Cinespace Chicago Film Studios as the development team 
for the redevelopment of Lawndale Complex and Ogden Courts East; 2) Negotiate 
and enter into a Redevelopment Agreement for Lawndale Complex and Ogden 
Courts East . . . .’”). 
 59. See Redevelopment Contract, supra note 57, at 1 (“OGDEN COMMONS JV 
LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the ‘Developer’) whose members are 
Habitat Ogden Commons LLC, . . .  Lawndale Ogden Development LLC, . . . and 
Ogden Commons MSH LLX . . . .” The Habitat Company LLC, Mount Sinai 
Hospital Medical Center of Chicago, and Cinespace Chicago Film Studios LLC, “by 
and through its affiliate LAWNDALE REAL ESTATE, LLC, . . . have an ownership 
interest in the member entities of the Developer . . . .”). 
 60. CHA minutes 2017, supra note 43. “Three acres are owned by SHS and 2.5-
acre parcel of land owned by Cinespace. With the addition of privately held land to 
the east and west of the CHA site, Ogden Commons development proposal 
encompasses a total of 10.9 acres.” Id. 
 61. See Redevelopment Contract, supra note 57, at 20.  
The Developer has worked and will continue to work with the [Chicago 
Housing] Authority to involve residents and resident organizations in the 
planning and redevelopment process for the Development. If requested by 
the Authority, the Developer shall provide quarterly updates on the 
redevelopment process and shall participate in meetings on the planning, 
development and construction process, giving careful consideration to 
residents’ suggestions.  
Id. at 15. 
 62. See id. at 8 (“The Developer, all of the Sponsors and the Authority agree to 
cooperate in good faith to obtain all necessary approvals from HUD.”). 
 63. See Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-
questions#qoz-business [https://perma.cc/BP7S-ZD5P] (last visited June 10, 2021) 
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also noted that many projects were “well into the development 
process before incorporating OZ” funding.64  Prior to construction, 
Ogden Commons was the site of two public housing projects, the 
Chicago Housing Authority’s Ogden Courts and the Lawndale 
Complex public housing project, which were demolished in 2005 and 
2000, respectively.65  In November 2018, the Chicago Planning 
Commission approved this mixed-use redevelopment of the Chicago 
Housing Authority’s site and private land.66  There are plans for office 
and retail space as well as mixed-income housing.67  As the President 
of The Habitat Co. asserted, “Not only will it bring the first new 
outpatient facilities to the area in more than 20 years, but the project 
will also add new restaurants, a bank, office space, and much-needed 
affordable housing — all while creating jobs and building the local 
economy.”68  Thus, the new commercial building will provide the 
community with additional health resources, a branch of Wintrust 
Bank, as well as a Steak ’n Shake franchise, Momentum Coffee, and 
Ja’ Grill restaurant — all minority-owned.69 
The top two floors are leased by the Mount Sinai Surgical & 
Ambulatory Care Center enabling the Sinai Health System to offer 
greater access to much needed outpatient surgical services70 
 
(listing Question 3, which states, as an answer, “[t]he first set of QOZ designations, 
covering parts of 18 states, were designated on April 9, 2018”). 
 64. Michael Snidal & Sandra Newman, Missed Opportunity: The West Baltimore 
Opportunity Zones Story 25 (Feb. 19, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Snidal-Newman-Brookings-
Draft-Feb-19-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX5L-XWAP]. 
 65. See Work Begins on Replacement for North Lawndale Public Housing, CHI. 
ARCHITECT (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.chicagoarchitecture.org/2020/03/09/work-
begins-on-replacement-for-north-lawndale-public-housing/ [https://perma.cc/HT3W-
FBSR] (a loss of approximately 327 units of housing); see also THE CHI. HOUS. 
AUTH., CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY: MTW ANNUAL REPORT FY2001, 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/CHAFY2001-ANNUAL-REPORT.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/8KP8-JWEX] (last visited Aug. 12, 2021). 
 66. See Redevelopment Contract, supra note 57, at 7. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Christine Serlin, Mixed-Use Development Breaks Ground in Chicago 
Opportunity Zone, AFFORDABLE HOUS. FIN. (Mar. 12, 2020), 
https://www.housingfinance.com/developments/mixed-use-development-breaks-
ground-in-chicago-opportunity-zone_o [https://perma.cc/7XCM-8UMP] (quoting 
Matt Fiascone, President of The Habitat Co.). 
 69. See Jay Koziarz, First Phase of Mixed-Use Ogden Commons Project Opens in 
North Lawndale, URBANIZE CHI. (June 16, 2021, 2:31 PM), 
https://urbanize.city/chicago/post/first-phase-mixed-use-ogden-commons-project-
opens-north-lawndale [https://perma.cc/8BZ7-LY85]. 
 70. See id.; see also SHS Press Release, supra note 44. 
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determined from surveying the community.71  The Sinai Health 
System also decided to expand the much-utilized dialysis program, 
“greatly needed due to the disproportionate burden of kidney disease 
in the community.”72  The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the 
health disparities in underserved communities such as North 
Lawndale.73  The Mount Sinai Surgical & Ambulatory Care Center in 
the Ogden Commons project will help to address some of these health 
inequities. 
The Ogden Commons Community Council (OCCC) was created 
with monthly meetings beginning July 29, 2020, to advise on plans for 
the Surgical & Ambulatory Care Center with respect to such issues as 
wrap around hospitality services (including possible valet parking 
service and transportation services) and the design of a comfortable 
and user-friendly space.  The OCCC will also “engage the broader 
community to solicit their ideas and better understand their needs to 
enhance the patient and client experience.”74  The commercial 
building that houses the Surgical & Ambulatory Care Center is 
expected to open in late 2021. 
The projected completion date of the entire Ogden Commons 
project is 2026.75  The residential component will start construction 
 
 71. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) requires tax-
exempt hospitals to conduct a Community Health Needs Assessments (CHNA) and 
Community Health Improvement Plan (CHIP) every three years. See Requirements 
for 501(c)(3) Hospitals Under the Affordable Care Act — Section 501(r), INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-
organizations/requirements-for-501c3-hospitals-under-the-affordable-care-act-
section-501r [https://perma.cc/VA9E-J773] (last visited Sept. 20, 2021). This CHNA is 
developed with community stakeholders and assesses the health of the communities 
served. See Community Health Needs Assessment for Charitable Hospital 
Organizations — Section 501(r)(3), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/community-health-needs-assessment-for-
charitable-hospital-organizations-section-501r3 [https://perma.cc/D6HS-SF4V] (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2021). 
 72. SHS Press Release, supra note 44. 
 73. Id. COVID-19 patients in the communities served by Mount Sinai had 
mortality rates of 17% versus 4.5% in Chicago. Id. 
 74. Ogden Commons Community Council Mission Statement (on file with 
author) (“The primary goals of the Ogden Commons Community Council are . . . [t]o 
give guidance, feedback and input on key areas of the Ogden Commons 
project[,] . . . [t]o provide the voice of community residents and patients[,] . . . [t]o 
provide on-going feedback and recommendations to Sinai leaders overseeing the 
Ogden Commons project.”). 
 75. See Press Release, City of Chi., Off. of the Mayor, Mayor Lightfoot 
Celebrates Accomplishments of Invest South/West on One Year Anniversary (Oct. 
26, 2020) [hereinafter Invest South/West Press Release]. 
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later in 2021.76  The first residential phase is a 110 unit “building with 
community activity space and an exterior children’s play area” that 
includes studios, one-bedroom, two-bedroom, and three-bedroom 
units.77  Forty percent of the units will be set aside for those on the 
housing authority waiting list.  Chicago Housing Authority project-
based vouchers will allow targeting of tenants to “pay an income-
based rent equal to the greater of 30% of the household’s adjusted 
monthly income or 10% of actual gross monthly income, less a utility 
allowance.”78  Furthermore, 50% of the units will be set aside for 
tenants at or below 60% or 80% of current area median income 
(AMI) and the final 10% will be unrestricted.79  The second phase 
will provide an additional 77 units in 2022.80 
II. FINANCING OF THE OGDEN COMMONS PROJECT 
A. Qualified Opportunity Funds 
So how was this $200 million project financed?  The commercial 
building phase of the project used OZ funds totaling $12.5 million 
from a qualified opportunity fund of PNC Bank as well as a $3 million 
 
 76. Updates, OGDEN COMMONS, https://www.ogdencommonschicago.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/NEZ4-AW93] (last visited Sept. 22, 2021) (“Construction of the 
residential component will begin in the fall of 2021.”). 
 77. Tenant Selection Plan: Ogden Commons Chicago, Illinois, CHI. HOUS. AUTH. 
[hereinafter Tenant Selection Plan], https://cha-assets.s3.us-east-
2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2021-
05/1.%202020%20TSP%20Ogden%20Commons.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PGJ-J2BA] 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2021). 
 78. Id. at 10. “These vouchers come from the transfer of assistance subsidies from 
a public housing site transitioning through HUD’s Rental Assistance Demonstration 
(RAD) program and called ‘RAD PBV Units’.” Id. at 1. 
 79. See Email from Jeff Head, Vice President of Dev., The Habitat Co. LLC, to 
author (May 4, 2021, 12:20 PM) (on file with author). Eighty-nine units are set aside 
for households with incomes no more than 60% of AMI and 11 units for households 
with incomes no more than 80% of AMI, “as established by the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit Program rules and regulations for the appropriate household 
size.” Tenant Selection Plan, supra note 77, at 10. 
 80. See KRISTIN FAUST, ILL. HOUS. DEV. AUTH., REPORT OF ACTIVITIES FOR 
FY2020 AND PROJECTED ACITVITIES FOR FY 2021  25 (Feb. 26, 2020) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter FY2020 GOVERNOR’S REPORT IHDA]; see also WICS/WRSP 
Staff, Illinois Awards $29 Million in Tax Credits for Affordable Housing, ABC 20 
(May 21, 2021), https://newschannel20.com/news/local/illinois-awards-29-million-in-
tax-credits-for-affordable-housing [https://perma.cc/P3GS-ASW9] (“Ogden 
Commons A-2: The Habitat Company will begin ‘Phase II’ of a mixed-use, mixed-
income development in North Lawndale. The 77-unit new construction building is 
located near Mt. Sinai Hospital, Cinespace Film Studios.”). 
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first mortgage from the bank.81  The OZ tax incentives do not come 
with any requirements to benefit the community82 even though it is 
clear that in order “to help distressed communities, there must be an 
affirmative effort for investments to reflect the needs of the residents 
within those communities.”83  The West Baltimore case study found 
that although the OZ tax incentive is “stimulating investment 
conversations . . . it is failing at oversight and community engagement 
and not changing development outcomes.”84 
The Ogden Commons developer, The Habitat Co., had a great deal 
of trouble attracting qualified Opportunity Zone funding because 
“mission-oriented projects struggle to compete for attention with 
higher return projects.”85  According to the West Baltimore study, 
“most OZ funds are seeking market rate returns on the same types of 
investments that other funds are making regardless of the OZ 
incentive.”86  An Urban Institute study found that “most developers 
and investors view OZ incentives as providing a relatively small boost 
to overall returns.”87  The West Baltimore study interviews and 
“reviews of project proformas indicate[d] that OZ’s year-five and 
year-seven step-up basis advantages” were not considered valuable to 
investors.88  The West Baltimore study also noted that the OZ 
investment funds were seeking internal rates of return (IRR) between 
10–16%, while projects in Baltimore’s distressed neighborhoods were 
generating IRRs no greater than 3–6%.89  In brief, the tax incentive is 
too weak to entice investors into these severely distressed 
 
 81. Serlin, supra note 68. 
 82. See THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at V (“As OZ 
incentives are not structured to encourage resident or community engagement, 
mission-oriented projects struggle to compete for attention with higher-return 
projects — for which OZs provide much larger subsidies because of the design of the 
incentives.”). 
 83. Layser et al., supra note 26, at 472–73. “Critics have also noted that incentives 
can be accessed without community input or any process of prioritization where local 
governments can ensure alignment with localized goals.” THEODOS ET AL., EARLY 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 2. 
 84. Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 3. 
 85. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 4. “[M]any mission-
oriented actors are struggling to access capital. Many project sponsors are struggling 
to access the class of investors — wealthy individuals and corporations with capital 
gains — for whom the OZ incentives are tailored.” Id. 
 86. Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 25. 
 87. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 20, at 4. “The OZ incentives have had mixed 
effects in terms of making projects work that would not otherwise happen.” Id. at VI. 
 88. Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 26 (reporting that “[o]ne Baltimore 
developer described them as ‘worthless’”). 
 89. See id. at 25. 
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neighborhoods even with an anchor tenant like Mount Sinai 
Hospital.90  Finally, The Habitat Co. reached out to PNC Bank.  This 
is a mission-driven investment for the bank,91 and the project helps it 
to satisfy its Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements.92 
The OZ money available for such projects is not enough to enable 
these projects to work financially without many additional sources of 
funding.  The Urban Institute study confirmed that “mission-oriented 
projects succeed in using OZs when the capital stack also layered in 
significant other subsidy sources.”93  In the case of the Ogden 
Commons commercial building phase of the project, the City of 
Chicago awarded a $2.5 million Neighborhood Opportunity Fund 
grant for the developer to outfit the interior of the building for the 
two restaurants, Steak ‘n Shake and Ja’ Grill — both minority-owned 
businesses.94  This funding required The Habitat Co. to have at least 
 
 90. See THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 4 (“[M]any 
mission-oriented projects yield below-market returns that most OZ investors appear 
unwilling to accept.”). 
 91. See Serlin, supra note 68 (“‘As the first to go to market with our Opportunity 
Zone Fund, we were able to work with the city of Chicago, the CHA, and Habitat to 
equitably reinvest in a project on Chicago’s West Side, which will provide affordable 
community health care, small business growth, job creation, and other positive 
economic impact,’ said Thurman ‘Tony’ Smith, PNC senior vice president and 
community development market manager in Chicago.”). 
 92. “Under the CRA regulation in effect for OCC-supervised banks until October 
1, 2020, loans, investments, or services in an opportunity zone transaction may be 
eligible for CRA consideration if they meet the definition of community 
development. Community development includes . . . community services targeted to 
LMI individuals . . . .” OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENTS FACT SHEET: OPPORTUNITY ZONES (2020), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/community-
affairs/community-developments-fact-sheets/cd-fact-sheet-opportunity-zones.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F3HX-2B8S] (footnote omitted) (citing 12 C.F.R § 25.12(g) (2019) 
(national banks) and 12 C.F.R. § 195.12(g) (FSAs)). 
 93. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 4 (stating “when a 
well-connected project sponsor was able to locate an investor willing to accept 
significantly below-market returns”). 
 94. See Chi., Ill., Ordinance 02019-2578, Ordinance for Redevelopment 
Agreement with Ogden Washtenaw JV LLC. for grant and expenditure of 
Neighborhoods Opportunity Funds at 2632 W Ogden Ave, 2638 Ogden Ave and 2646 
W Ogden Ave (2019); see also Press Release, Off. of the Mayor, City of Chi., Mayor 
Emanuel Announces Two Retail Tenants Coming to Ogden Commons (Mar. 15, 
2019), https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/
Press%20Releases/2019/March/RetailOgdenCommons.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV45-
MCW7] (“Two African-American-Owned Restaurants [Steak ‘n Shake and Ja’ Grill] 
will offer first sit-down restaurants . . . and help boost new commercial development 
in the community.”). “‘The City’s Neighborhood Opportunity Fund and Mayor 
Lightfoot’s transformative vision for North Lawndale has made it possible for me to 
bring my business to Ogden Commons,’ said Melvin Buckley, owner/franchisee of the 
Ogden Commons Steak ‘n Shake.” Invest South/West Press Release, supra note 75. 
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26% Minority Business Enterprise and 6% Woman Business 
Enterprise participation for the project’s direct and indirect costs of 
construction.95  Furthermore, “[c]ity residents must perform 50% of 
al! [sic] construction hours.”96 
As part of the Chicago mayor’s commitment to addressing 
healthcare deserts,97 Mount Sinai’s North Lawndale Surgical & 
Ambulatory Care Center was awarded $7 million from Community 
Development Block Grant money that became available as part of 
the CARES Act funding for the City of Chicago.98  This funding also 
came with certain requirements that were intended to benefit the 
community residents.99  So, the Ogden Commons case study as well as 
the other case studies discussed in this Article demonstrates that 
social-impact projects require multiple sources of funding (capital 
stacking).  Fortunately, the other funding sources, whether federal, 
state, local, or philanthropic, are accompanied by rules requiring 
community benefits such as affordable housing, employment, or 
social services for the local residents.100 
 
 95. Application of an Amendment to the Chicago Zoning Ordinance, City of Chi. 
(Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/
zlup/Planning_and_Policy/Agendas/cpc_materials/11_2020/Zoning%20Amendment
%20Application%20-%20PD%201430%20Amendment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KUU3-F2DA] (attaching an ordinance to be amended, which holds 
that there must be a certain amount of minority-owned and women-owned 
businesses). 
 96. NOF Conditional Award Letter from David Reifman, Comm’r, Dep’t of Plan. 
& Dev., to Jeff Head, Ogden Washtenaw JV LLC (Mar. 7, 2019). 
 97. See Invest South/West Press Release, supra note 75. 
 98. See SHS Press Release, supra note 44. “The funding allocation was approved 
by the City Council on June 17th.” Id. 
 99. Kelly Bauer, Auburn Gresham, North Lawndale Getting $11 Million For New 
Health Centers, BLOCK CLUB (June 29, 2020, 4:07 PM CDT), 
https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/06/29/auburn-gresham-north-lawndale-getting-11-
million-for-new-health-centers/ [https://perma.cc/47TP-QPRW] (“The center will be 
30,000 square feet and will help Mount Sinai Health System provide health care on 
the West Side.”). 
 100. See THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at VI. “Maryland 
offers enhancements to other state tax credit programs for qualified OZ businesses if 
they agree to provide the state with transaction-level reporting, and additional 
enhancement for projects that have a community benefits agreement or community 
residents on their governing/advisory board and provide a resolution/letter from their 
locality or county.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (citing Maryland Opportunity Zone 
Enhancement Credits, MD. DEP’T COM., https://commerce.maryland.gov/fund/
programs-for-businesses/opportunity-zone-enhancement-credits 
[https://perma.cc/D5F5-RWEN] (last visited Apr. 26, 2020)). 
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B. Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 
The residential component of the project utilizes LIHTCs,101 which 
do come with requirements about the affordability of the housing 
produced.102  Since its inception, the LIHTC program has supported 
the construction or rehabilitation of over 3 million housing units.103  
Although a federal tax incentive, the program is predominately 
administered by the appropriate state HFA.104  Most tax credit units 
are produced by for-profit developers who typically sell shares in the 
project, either through large public offerings or private placements 
and other partnership arrangements, to one or more outside 
investors.105  Primarily, these investors are banks seeking to garner 
CRA points.106  These investors then claim the tax credits over ten 
years.107 
 
 101. The LIHTC was enacted as part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, and has been modified numerous times. See generally Kaye, supra note 21. See 
also, e.g., Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, §§ 
3001-05, 122 Stat. 2654, 2878–85 (temporarily increasing the per capita allocation of 
LIHTCs by 10% for each state for 2008 and 2009). The ceiling was also increased by 
12.5% for 2019, 2020, and 2021 over concern about a potential drop in demand for 
LIHTCs by corporate and financial institutional investors because of the reduction in 
the corporate tax rate by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. See generally 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348. 
 102. See I.R.C. §§ 42(g)(l)–(2). See also infra notes 122–23 and text accompanying 
for more details on the mandated affordability of the housing. 
 103. See LIHTC Database, HUD USER, https://lihtc.huduser.gov/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZM63-DW3F] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021). 
 104. See MARK KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22389, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT 4 (2021). 
 105. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE FOR LOW-INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS 6 (2015), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-
2016/reports/50782-lowincomehousing.pdf [https://perma.cc/75Y7-9S8T]. 
 106. See Cassandra Jones Havard, The Community Reinvestment Act, Banks, and 
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 
415, 417–18 (2017). The CohnReznick study estimated that corporations invested 
“approximately $10 billion of capital to finance housing credit projects in 2012, and 
that approximately 85% of this capital came from the banking sector.” 
COHNREZNICK LLP, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND ITS EFFECT ON 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT PRICING 10, 
https://ahic.org/images/downloads/Research_and_Education/the_community_reinvest
ment_act_and_its_effect_on_housing_tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/MVK8-72V8] (last 
visited June 11, 2021) (analyzing another CohnReznick’s report that analyzed the 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program at the program’s 25th anniversary). 
 107. See I.R.C. § 42(f)(1). The low-income housing credit may be claimed annually, 
generally over a ten-year period, by an owner of a qualified residential rental project 
beginning with the taxable year in which the building is placed in service. See id. 
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A taxpayer’s credit amount in any taxable year is computed by 
applying the appropriate credit percentage108 to the proportion of the 
eligible basis in a qualified low-income building that is attributable to 
the low-income rental units.109  The LIHTC statute originally 
specified that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would periodically 
reset the specified credit percentages to maintain the present value of 
the ten-year stream of tax credits at 70% or 30% of the qualified 
basis.110  However, since 2008, Congress has specified that the 
minimum credit rate for the 70% present value credit should be at 
least 9%, regardless of prevailing interest rates.111  Concerned when 
the credit percentage for tax-exempt financed or rehabilitation 
projects dropped to a historic low of 3.07% in 2020, the 2021 
Consolidated Appropriations Act112 fixed the rate for this tax credit at 
4%, providing a 4% floor like the 9% floor that was previously 
established for the 70% present value credit.113 
 
 108. See id. §§ 42(b)(1)(A)–(B); see also Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3002, 122 Stat. 2654, 2879. This change was made 
permanent in 2016. Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 
131, 129 Stat. 2242, 3055 (2015) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 42(b)(2)). Thus, in a 
low interest rate environment, the present value of the credits claimed over ten years 
will exceed 70% of the qualified basis. See I.R.C. § 42(b)(1)(B)(i). 
 109. See I.R.C. § 42(d)(3). The eligible basis of a new building is its adjusted basis, 
which includes construction costs and other costs for depreciable property 
attributable to the building. Id. The cost of land, market rate units, syndication and 
financing are not eligible for the credit. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH 
CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 157 
(Comm. Print 1987). 
 110. See I.R.C. §§ 42(b)(1)(A)–(B). The so-called 9% credit is generally awarded 
for new construction and is intended to deliver up to a 70% subsidy. KEIGHTLEY, 
supra note 104, at 1. These competitive awards “are drawn from a state’s annual 
LIHTC allocation authority.” See id. at 1 n.2. The so-called 4% credit is either used 
for rehabilitation projects or projects using “at least 50% in federally tax-exempt 
bond financing and is designed to deliver up to a 30% subsidy.” Id. at 1. Developers 
are automatically awarded 4% tax credits for the qualified tax-exempt bond financed 
projects. Id. at 1 n.2. “These 4% tax credits are not drawn from a state’s annual 
LIHTC allocation.” Id. The 30% and 70% subsidy levels are computed as the present 
value of the 10-year stream of tax credits divided by the development’s qualified basis 
(roughly the cost of construction excluding land). Id. at 1. 
 111. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act § 3002. This change was made 
permanent in 2016. Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2016 § 131, 129 Stat. at 3055 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 42(b)(2)). Thus, in the current low interest rate 
environment, the present value of the credits claimed over ten years will exceed 70% 
of the qualified basis. See KEIGHTLEY, supra note 104, at 3. 
 112. See Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182 (2020). 
 113. See id. § 201, 134 Stat. 3056 (amending I.R.C. § 42(b) to provide that the 
applicable percentage shall not be less than 4% for 4% tax credit projects, which will 
increase the amount of tax credit equity that can be raised for such projects). 
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Projects financed with the proceeds of tax-exempt bonds subject to 
the state volume cap under Internal Revenue Code section 146 are 
not required to receive an allocation of credit authority from the 
appropriate state or local HFA.114  If Housing Bonds finance at least 
50% of an affordable housing development, the development is 
eligible to receive the 4% LIHTC.115  Thus, for the initial phase of the 
Ogden Commons residential project that is financed using tax-exempt 
bonds, the project will be automatically awarded the 4% LIHTC.116  
However, the developers, like The Habitat Co., must apply to receive 
Housing Bond authority from the state.117  Furthermore, the project 
must still satisfy the requirements for allocation of a housing credit 
under the qualified allocation plan applicable to the area where the 
project is located, in this case Illinois.118  In addition, in Illinois, all 
projects planning to apply to the Illinois Housing Development 
Authority (IHDA) for an allocation of LIHTCs must first submit a 
Preliminary Project Assessment prior to submitting a full 
application.119 
 
 114. See I.R.C. § 42(h)(4); see also JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., 
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 167 (Comm. Print 1987) 
(noting that exemption from the mandatory allocation requirement is provided for 
buildings financed with proceeds of tax-exempt bonds). 
 115. For example, in FY 2019, the Illinois Housing Development Authority in 
conjunction with tax-exempt bond deals allocated a total of $26,771,363 in 4% 
Federal Tax Credits, totaling approximately $221,520,521, and creating 2,878 units, 
2,870 of which were designated for low-income residents. See FY2020 GOVERNOR’S 
REPORT IHDA, supra note 80, at 42–43. 
 116. Generally, any building eligible for the credit must receive an allocation of 
credit authority from the state or local housing credit agency where the qualifying 
low-income housing project is located. See I.R.C. § 42(h)(1). 
 117. The Treasury Department allocates private activity bond (PAB) authority to 
state governments based on population size. States can choose to allocate a portion of 
their PAB authority to issue multifamily Housing Bonds. See generally STEVEN 
MAGUIRE & JOSEPH S. HUGHES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31457, PRIVATE ACTIVITY 
BONDS: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2018). For example, the IHDA received 18 
applications seeking $298,332,211 to construct 2,704 units of housing through its bond 
financing programs in FY 2019. During FY 2019, the Authority financed 
approximately $392,058,194 for first mortgage loans on 21 multi-family developments 
located in the State. See FY2020 GOVERNOR’S REPORT IHDA, supra note 80, at 9, 11. 
 118. See I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(D); see also id. § 42(h)(1); ILL. HOUS. DEV. AUTH., 
2020–2021 LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN 15 (on 
file with author) [hereinafter ILLINOIS QAP]. 
 119. See Affordable Housing Tax Credit, ILL. HOUS. DEV. AUTH., 
https://www.ihda.org/developers/tax-credits/ [https://perma.cc/83FF-NDJV] (last 
visited Aug. 12, 2021). “Applications for Tax Credits generated from tax-exempt 
bond financed projects shall be submitted pursuant to a competitive Tax Exempt 
Municipal Bond application funding round process. However, such projects must 
meet the same requirements as projects applying for Tax Credits from the Credit 
Ceiling. In addition, the same application is required for projects anticipating 
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Each state HFA’s qualified allocation plan must include project 
selection criteria such as: housing need characteristics, project 
characteristics, sponsor characteristics, tenant populations with 
special housing needs, and public housing waiting lists as well as 
allocation preference for projects serving the lowest income tenants 
or obligated to serve qualified tenants for the longest periods.120  
Illinois has prioritized underserved populations, such as 1) “[l]ow-
income households” — particularly those “households earning below 
30% of Area Median Income[,]” 2) “[l]ow- and moderate- income 
persons unable to afford housing near work or transportation[,]” 3) 
“[l]ow-income people residing in communities with ongoing 
community revitalization efforts[,]” and 4) “[o]ther special needs 
populations, including people with criminal records and veterans 
experiencing or at risk of homelessness.”121 
The low-income housing credit is available only on rent-restricted 
units that are leased to qualifying low-income tenants.122  Residential 
rental projects qualify for the tax credit only if 1) 20% or more of the 
units are occupied by individuals with incomes that are no more than 
50% of area median income, as adjusted for family size, or 2) 40% or 
more of the units are occupied by individuals with incomes that are 
no more than 60% of area median income, as adjusted for family 
size.123  The 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act added a third 
income test option, the ability to average the incomes of tenants when 
applying the income restriction tests.124  However, no tenant’s income 
can exceed 80% of the area median income.125  A qualified residential 
rental project must remain as rental property with a minimum 
number of rent-restricted units for at least 30 years.126 
 
generating Tax Credits from tax-exempt bond financing as is required for projects 
applying for Tax Credits from the Credit Ceiling.” CITY OF CHI. DEP’T. OF HOUS., 
2019 LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN 1, 4 (2019), 
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/doh/qap/qap_2019/2019_qap_final.pd
f [https://perma.cc/B9KS-FD2A]. 
 120. See I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(C). 
 121. ILLINOIS QAP, supra note 118, at 15–16. 
 122. See I.R.C. §§ 42(g)(l)–(2). Gross rent is restricted to 30% of the imputed 
income limitation, which is determined by assuming a family size equivalent to 1.5 
times the number of bedrooms in the housing unit. See id. § 42(g)(2). 
 123. See id. § 42(g)(1). 
 124. Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 103, 132 Stat. 348, 1157 (amending I.R.C. § 42(g)) 
 125. See id. § 102(a), 132 Stat. at 540–41. 
 126. See I.R.C. §§ 42(h)(6), (i)(1). The credit is recaptured with interest from all 
owners if the project fails to comply with the rent limits and set aside requirements 
during this compliance period or from any owner who sells his interest in the project. 
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The Habitat Co. applied for tax-exempt bond financing for the first 
phase of the residential portion of the project and for the 9% LIHTC 
for an additional 77 units, the second phase.127  The Illinois Housing 
Authority Board members approved the 9% LIHTC for Phase II, 
Ogden Commons A-2, in April 2021.128  The use of Chicago Housing 
Authority seller financing and a ground lease triggered further 
requirements regarding local hiring.129  Thus, the residential portion 
of the Ogden Commons project is subject to many rules intended to 
benefit the community. 
Current barriers to using qualified opportunity funds “for 
affordable housing include the law’s emphasis on increasing property 
value to receive capital gains tax relief,”130 the lack of any 
requirement that qualified opportunity funds adopt a social mission as 
part of the self-certification process,131 and barriers to involving 
nonprofits in OZ transactions.132  Developers are also unable to easily 
combine OZ funding with the LIHTCs for a variety of reasons.133  
Affordable housing projects do not generate the kind of return 
demanded by most OZ funds, given the limited cash flow during the 
15-year compliance period.134  In addition, LIHTC properties often 
 
See id. § 42(j). Under some conditions, however, an owner may terminate this 
commitment after 15 years. See id. §§ 42(h)(6)(E)–(I). 
 127. See FY2020 GOVERNOR’S REPORT IHDA, supra note 80, at 25; see also 
WICS/WRSP Staff, supra note 80. 
 128. See WICS/WRSP Staff, supra note 80. 
 129. Telephone Interview with Jeff Head, Vice President of Dev., The Habitat Co. 
LLC (Feb. 19, 2021) (on file with author). 
 130. Layser et al., supra note 26, at 473 (citing Edward W. De Barbieri, 
Opportunism Zones, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 82 (2020)). 
 131. See Edward W. De Barbieri, Opportunism Zones, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
82, 154 (2020). 
 132. See Layser et al., supra note 26, at 473; see also Michelle D. Layser, Nonprofit 
Participation in Place-Based Tax Incentive Transactions, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
(forthcoming Oct. 2021) [hereinafter Layser, Nonprofit Participation] (“The 
requirement that Opportunity Funds make equity investments presents a significant 
barrier to using Opportunity Funds to support the activities of tax-exempt nonprofit 
organizations.”). 
 133. See generally Glenn A. Graff, Issues and Opportunities When Combining 




 134. See Jeff Head, Can Tax Credits and Opportunity Zones Be Combined? Yes 
But . . . , NAT’L APARTMENT ASS’N (Dec. 2019), https://www.naahq.org/news-
publications/units/december-2019/article/can-tax-credits-and-opportunity-zones-be-
combined-yes- [https://perma.cc/7R3A-FGZX]. “A further challenge for mission-
oriented projects is that the sponsors are seeking to support a community asset with a 
lifetime well beyond the 10-year time horizon of the OZ incentives. Given that an 
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depreciate by the end of the 15-year compliance period because of the 
additional 15 years of affordability and sales restrictions.135  This 
neutralizes the OZ tax incentive of a basis step-up after holding the 
property for ten years.136 
LIHTC investors are primarily banks that invest in part to comply 
with the CRA,137 whereas most OZ investors are high-net-worth 
individuals looking to shelter capital gains with very different 
expectations.138  For 2019, the average household income for OZ 
investors exceeded $1 million — “approximately ten times higher 
than the national average household income of $104,158.”139  “Typical 
LIHTC investors such as banks often lack significant capital gains,”140 
thus banks with qualified opportunity funds are unusual.141  The 
Ogden Commons project benefitted from finding this mission-driven 
investor for the commercial portion of the project but found no such 
OZ investor for the residential portion of the project. 
 
illiquid investment over a 10-year horizon is already challenging for OZ investors, the 
type of investment many mission actors need and the OZ market’s investment 
parameters are mismatched.” THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 
4. 
 135. See Graff, supra note 133, at 4. 
 136. See id. at 1, 3 (noting, however, that “Section 7701(g) can apply allowing the 
investor to step up its Year 15 QOF basis to at least the amount of the nonrecourse 
debt.” This step-up “should allow the OZLIHTC investor to avoid some or all of the 
exit taxes that would otherwise be due”). 
 137. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-66, LOW-INCOME HOUSING 
TAX CREDITS: AGENCIES IMPLEMENTED CHANGES ENACTED IN 2008, BUT PROJECT 
DATA COLLECTION COULD BE IMPROVED 10 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-
13-66.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK7M-LXS3]; see also OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF 
THE CURRENCY, LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS: AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR BANKS (2014), https://www.occ.gov/publications-
and-resources/publications/community-affairs/community-developments-
insights/pub-insights-mar-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS4U-YFTB]. 
 138. The OZ tax incentive benefits wealthy individuals given that the top 1% of 
households have 69% of all reported capital gains. See Capital Gains Go 
Overwhelmingly to Wealthy Families, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
https://www.cbpp.org/capital-gains-go-overwhelmingly-to-wealthy-families 
[https://perma.cc/KB8N-29Z5] (last visited Sept. 21, 2021); see also Kennedy & 
Wheeler, supra note 10, at 19 (arguing that “the direct tax incidence of the OZ 
program is likely to benefit households in the 99th percentile of the national 
household income distribution”). 
 139. Kennedy & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 19. 
 140. Graff, supra note 133, at 3. 
 141. “[A]pproximately 88% of the partners of higher-tier” qualified opportunity 
fund partnerships were individuals. Kennedy & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 19. 
Furthermore, 82% of the OZ funds’ investment is concentrated in partnerships. See 
id. at 10. 
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III. COMPARISON OF THE LIHTC PROGRAM WITH THE 
OPPORTUNITY ZONE TAX INCENTIVE 
A. Similarities Between the LIHTC Program and the Opportunity 
Zone Tax Incentive 
There are several similarities between the LIHTC program and the 
Opportunity Zone tax incentive.142  Both incorporate the concept of 
public-private partnerships that is incentivizing private investors to 
invest their capital respectively either in affordable rental housing or 
“in high-impact projects in economically distressed communities.”143  
In addition, both the LIHTC program and the Opportunity Zone tax 
incentive have holding period requirements and require a certain 
amount of technical expertise to implement. 
1. Holding Period Requirements 
To accomplish this goal of incentivizing private investors, both tax 
incentive programs provide preferential tax treatment for the 
investments if the investor holds the investment for a specified period.  
The LIHTC program provides tax credits over a ten-year period for 
investments held for at least 15 years.144  If an owner sells or transfers 
title while the property is still within its 15-year initial compliance 
period, this transfer generally requires the recapture of these tax 
credits.145  “During such a recapture event, the owner loses any 
projected future” LIHTCs from the property and must also repay 
one-third of the LIHTCs previously claimed.146 
The Opportunity Zone tax incentive provides for the deferral of an 
initial capital gains tax as well as a varying level of capital gains tax 
reductions dependent on holding the qualifying assets either five, 
 
 142. For a discussion of the New Markets Tax Credit and its differences with the 
Opportunity Zone tax incentive, see Rebecca Lester, Cody Evans & Hanna Tian, 
Opportunity Zones: An Analysis of the Policy’s Implications, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 221, 
226–28 (2018), http://opportunityzones.stanford.edu/docs/OpportunityZones-
AnalysisofPolicyImplications.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GWB-RM5T]; see also Layser, 
Nonprofit Participation, supra note 132 (manuscript at 4). 
 143. See Booker testimony, supra note 3, at 2. 
 144. See infra note 170 for description of the requirements. 
 145. COHNREZNICK LLP, HOUSING TAX CREDIT INVESTMENTS: INVESTMENT AND 
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 36 (2018). 
 146. Id. (adding that “[a]dditional interest and penalties may apply, which may or 
may not be covered by a recapture guarantee backstopped by the guarantors of the 
transaction”). 
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seven, or ten years.147  For example, if the qualifying investment is 
held for at least five years, the taxpayer increases the basis by an 
amount equaling 10% of the amount of gain deferred, in effect 
getting to both defer and reduce the payment of taxes on the 
taxpayer’s initial capital gains.148  Furthermore, if a taxpayer holds the 
QOF investment for at least ten years, the taxpayer may increase the 
basis to the fair market value at the date of sale, in effect deferring 
payment of taxes on the initial capital gains and eliminating the taxes 
on the appreciation of the QOF investment.149 
Thus, the amount of the tax benefit is relatively fixed for the 
LIHTC investor as the residual value is not an important 
consideration for many corporate investors.  The investor’s return is 
expected to be primarily derived from the tax benefits.  The investor 
is “effectively purchasing a financial asset in the form of a stream of 
tax benefits (consisting of tax credits and passive losses associated 
with depreciation and mortgage interest deductions).”150  The OZ 
investor’s tax benefit, however, depends on the holding period and 
the future appreciation of the qualified assets. 
2. Technical Expertise Requirements 
The professionals involved in the Ogden Commons project talked 
about the difficulties of putting together financing with either OZ 
funds or LIHTCs.151  As is common with these mission-driven 
projects, both sides of this project, the commercial building as well as 
the residential phases, needed to stack multiple sources of debt and 
equity in order to make the project work financially.  LIHTCs have 
been around since 1986, so there is a more mature market and easier 
access to technical expertise.  Technical advisors have noted that “the 
Credit moves through allocation, delivery, and monetization via a 
well-established, experienced, transparent, competitive, rapid-
 
 147. Specifically, a taxpayer who realizes a gain from a sale of property and 
reinvests that gain in a QOF within a designated time frame may defer recognition of 
the gain. See I.R.C. §§ 1400Z-2(a)(1), (b)(1); see also I.R.S. Notice 2021-10, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-21-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5ZU-K3BY]. 
 148. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the taxpayer holds the investment for at 
least seven years, the taxpayer further increases the basis by an amount equaling 5% 
of the amount of gain deferred. See id. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iv). If the taxpayer holds 
the investment for at least ten years, the taxpayer gets to both defer payment of taxes 
on the taxpayer’s initial capital gains and to eliminate the capital gains taxes on the 
QOF investment. See id. § 1400Z-2(c). 
 149. See id. § 1400Z-2I. 
 150. COHNREZNICK LLP, supra note 145, at 14. 
 151. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Jeff Head, supra note 129. 
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feedback marketplace.”152  This, of course, has resulted from the 
development of experienced stakeholders and infrastructure but still 
requires legal and other advisors to implement and comply with all 
the technical requirements. 
Utilizing OZ funds also requires a certain level of technical 
expertise, and there are particular difficulties in attracting most 
private investment to below-market projects.  Michael Snidal noted 
that the public housing authorities appeared to be largely unfamiliar 
with the OZ tax incentive when he presented his West Baltimore 
study at the Council of Large Public Housing Authorities’ annual 
meeting in the fall of 2019.153  Even with a foundation-funded OZ 
Czar in Baltimore, “community stakeholders and small developers 
fe[lt] there ha[d] been insufficient education and engagement at the 
neighborhood level.”154  The West Baltimore study concluded that the 
OZ tax incentive “is a sufficiently complicated economic 
development tool that requires federal funding for education and 
engagement.”155 
Foundations, nonprofit organizations, and federal, state, and local 
governments are closing the education gap.  For example, in 2019, the 
Rockefeller Foundation and Smart Growth America launched the 
National Opportunity Zones Academy to assist selected cities to 
attract socially responsible investment.156  These cities, which include 
Chicago, receive access to technical assistance, “socially responsible 
investors through curated introductory events,” and shared best 
practices among the participating cities.157  Like other cities and 
states, the City of Chicago has collected various resources and 
 
 152. RECAPITALIZATION ADVISORS, INC., THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT 
EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY: A PRESENTATION OF THE ISSUES 4–5 (2002). 
 153. Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 31. 
 154. Id. at 45. The Abell foundation funded the Baltimore City’s OZ coordinator 
position. Id. at 16. 
 155. Id. at 24. 
 156. See Press Release, The Rockfeller Found., The Rockefeller Foundation and 
Smart Growth America Launch National Opportunity Zones Academy (Sept. 17, 
2019), https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/news/rockefeller-foundation-smart-
growth-america-launch-national-opportunity-zones-academy/ 
[https://perma.cc/ERF8-TZST] (announcing the initial selection of five cities “to 
participate in the Academy including Chicago, Greater Miami and the Beaches, 
Pittsburgh, Seattle, and Norfolk, VA.”). 
 157. Id. (“SGA’s technical assistance team and its LOCUS program will work 
directly with each participating city to create place-based, community-led approaches 
to developing sustainable growth and development strategies that help transform 
selected Opportunity Zones into economically-thriving and socially-inclusive, 
walkable neighborhoods.”). 
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interactable maps on its public website for developers and investors 
to use to more easily navigate the Opportunity Zones and available 
projects.158  In addition, the Chicago Community Loan Fund created 
the Chicagoland Opportunity Zones Consortium to connect investors 
and developers with projects and stakeholders in the Chicagoland 
areas.159  The Urban Institute study observes that the OZ tax 
incentive is stimulating “the evolution of a new community 
development ecosystem, engaging both project developers and 
investors who have limited historical engagement in community 
development work.”160  Thus, the development of the needed 
technical expertise and the maturation of the OZ marketplace is 
happening. 
B. Differences Between the LIHTC Program and the Opportunity 
Zone Tax Incentive 
There are, however, substantial differences between the LIHTC 
program and the Opportunity Zone tax incentive.  The main 
difference is that the LIHTC requires the provision of a particular 
good of value to the public (below-market housing), whereas the OZ 
tax incentive does not have any such requirement.  No local jobs need 
to be created, no “community-based organizations or disadvantaged 
businesses supported, or any needed community assets — like 
affordable housing — constructed.”161  Furthermore, in contrast to 
the very minimal requirements for self-certifying as a qualified 
opportunity fund, there are very extensive requirements for obtaining 
an allocation of LIHTCs. 
Second, the federal cost of the LIHTC program is capped, whereas 
the cost of the OZ tax incentive is only limited by the number of 
qualified investors, those with capital gains willing to invest such in 
qualified opportunity zone property.162  Unlike the LIHTC, there is 
 
 158. See Opportunity Zones, CHI. (May 11, 2018), 
https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/opportunity-zones.html 
[https://perma.cc/EZ78-56HT]. 
 159. See Meet the Cities, SMART GROWTH AM., 
https://smartgrowthamerica.org/program/national-opportunity-zones-academy/meet-
the-cities/ [https://perma.cc/F3WZ-HQE7] (last visited June 18, 2021). 
 160. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 4. 
 161. Brandon M. Weiss, Opportunity Zones, 1031 Exchanges, and Universal 
Housing Vouchers, 110 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022). 
 162. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-30, OPPORTUNITY ZONES: 
IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO EVALUATE TAX EXPENDITURE PERFORMANCE 8–
9 (2020), 
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no limit on “the total amount that can be deferred as a result of 
investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds” or on “how much federal 
revenue is reduced by” claiming the tax incentive.163 
Finally, although in theory both the LIHTC and the OZ tax 
incentive programs are nationally available, a study by two University 
of California, Berkeley Economics graduate students, Patrick 
Kennedy and Harrison Wheeler, demonstrates that the OZ 
investment is highly spatially concentrated in approximately 30 
states.164  LIHTC affordable housing projects, on the other hand, can 
be found in every state.165 
1. Administration of the LIHTC and OZ Programs 
To qualify for the LIHTCs, a developer must submit a written 
application to the state HFA designated by each state to allocate the 
state’s authorized credit allocation.166  As previously described, this 
state HFA must have adopted a Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) to 
guide its approval process that sets forth the selection criteria, the 
allocation process, and the compliance monitoring procedures.167  
This QAP must include a 10% set aside for nonprofit developers.168  
These plans are developed and revised through a “public process, 
 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2PS-HX8S] (noting that 
the OZ tax incentive “has fewer limits on the types of projects that can be financed, 
and fewer fiscal controls to limit potential revenue losses”). 
 163. Id. at 10. 
 164. See Kennedy & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 1, 3 (noting in the author’s 
footnote that the “research embodies work undertaken for the staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation”). 
 165. See 2021 Federal LIHTC Information by State, NOVOGRADAC, 
https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/affordable-housing-tax-credits/2021-
federal-lihtc-information-state [https://perma.cc/DG7M-KA9H] (last visited Aug. 8, 
2021) (indicating specific state-by-state allocation of credit). 
 166. As detailed in Section II.B, although projects financed with the private 
activity tax-exempt bonds do not need a separate allocation for the 4% LIHTC, the 
developer must have applied to the state housing financing agency for the bond 
authority. 
 167. See KEIGHTLEY, supra note 104, at 1 n.1, 4 (“Computed as the average 
estimated tax expenditure associated with the program between FY2020 and FY2024. 
This figure does not include revenue loss associated with the changes to the LIHTC 
program enacted by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, P.L. 116-260. These 
changes are estimated to reduce federal revenues by $6.7 billion between FY2021 and 
FY2030.”). See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATES 
OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2020–2024 27 (Comm. Print 
2020); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS 
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 116-68, THE 
“CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2021” (Comm. Print 2020). 
 168. See I.R.C. § 42(h)(5). 
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allowing for input from the general public and local communities, as 
well as LIHTC stakeholders.”169 
If the developer’s application for LIHTCs is approved through this 
competitive process, the developer has demonstrated that its project 
meets the state’s need for affordable housing as defined in the state’s 
QAP.  The state HFA then funds the qualified project and provides 
the developer with the associated tax credits.  The developer typically 
sells the tax credits to private investors either directly or through a 
syndicator to obtain the funding necessary for the project.170 
In contrast, there is no requirement that the OZ investment benefit 
the community or that the public be consulted with respect to the 
project.  As discussed previously, there are actual barriers to 
involving nonprofits in Opportunity Zone transactions.171  
Furthermore, administrative steps for qualification for qualified 
opportunity funds are minimal.  Qualified opportunity funds must 
submit a Form 8996, Qualified Opportunity Fund, initially and 
annually, to the IRS to self-certify that the corporation or partnership 
is a QOF.172  The form requires minimal information such as the 
name of the entity, identification number, census tracts, and the QOZ 
property that is directly owned or leased by the taxpayer.173 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) treats investment 
interests in QOFs as securities, so funds must also register with the 
SEC unless they file for an exemption within 15 days of the first sale 
 
 169. KEIGHTLEY, supra note 104, at 4. 
 170. Investors claim the LIHTC over a ten-year period once the housing is placed 
in service. However, the LIHTC projects must comply with the income and rent 
restrictions for 15 years otherwise the tax credits will be recaptured. I.R.C. §§ 
42(i)(1), (j). The statute also imposes an extended low-income housing commitment 
of an additional 15 years that is subject to some exceptions. See id. § 42(h)(6); see 
also Kaye, supra note 21, at 878–80. 
 171. See Layser et al., supra note 26, at 473–74. See generally Layser, Nonprofit 
Participation, supra note 132. 
 172. See Form 8996: Qualified Opportunity Fund, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8996.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JVU-VR9Y] (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2021) (“By checking this box, you certify that by the end of the taxpayer’s 
first QOF year, the taxpayer’s organizing documents include a statement of the 
entity’s purpose of investing in QOZ property and a description of the trade or 
business(es) that the QOF is engaged in either directly or through a QOZ 
business.”). 
 173. See id. The QOFs also use the form to report compliance with the 90% asset 
test “or to calculate a penalty if it fails to meet that test.” U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-30, supra note 162, at 12. 
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of securities in an offering.174  Investors in a QOF must file a Form 
8997, Initial and Annual Statement of Qualified Opportunity Fund 
(QOF) Investments, to report ongoing investments, new investments, 
dispositions of Fund interests, and the corresponding gains 
deferred.175 
2. Federal Cost of the LIHTC and OZ Programs 
Each state is granted an amount of LIHTCs pursuant to a federally 
designated formula based on a state’s population and other factors.176  
For 2021, this amount is the larger of approximately $3.2 million or 
$2.81 per capita for each state.177  Funding for the LIHTC is capped 
and is expected to result in revenue foregone of on average $10.9 
billion annually.178  The Joint Committee on Taxation’s (JCT) 
revenue estimates assume that the tax credit will be predominantly 
used by corporations.  “In most states, competition for LIHTC 
resources is fierce”179 with a 3 to 1 ratio of submitted applications for 
the 9% tax credits to the credits the state has available to distribute.180  
Furthermore, any unused credit authority is placed in a national pool 
to be reallocated among the qualified states.181  Because the LIHTC is 
a scarce resource, only a limited number of applications will be 
allocated credits.182 
 
 174. See THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE IMPACT OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES: 
AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT 15 (2020). QOFs seeking an exemption can file Form D and 
provide information such as the amount sold in the offering. Id. 
 175. Form 8997, Initial and Annual Statement of Qualified Opportunity Fund 
(QOF) Investments, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f8997.pdf [https://perma.cc/R89N-4UVQ] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
 176. See 2021 Federal LIHTC Information by State, supra note 165. 
 177. See Rev. Proc. 2020-45, 2020-27 I.R.B. 3. These numbers are adjusted for 
inflation. “These figures reflect a temporary increase in the amount of credits each 
state received as a result of the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-141). 
The increase is equal to 12.5% above what states would have received absent P.L. 
115-141, and is in effect through 2021.” KEIGHTLEY, supra note 104, at 4. 
 178. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL 
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2020–2024 27 (Comm. Print 2020). 
 179. Kirk McClure et al., The LIHTC Program, Racially/Ethnically Concentrated 
Areas of Poverty, and High-Opportunity Neighborhoods, 6 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 89, 
110 (2020). 
 180. See COHNREZNICK LLP, supra note 145, at 10. 
 181. I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(D); see, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2020-42, 2020-41 I.R.B. 891 
(showing the amount of unused housing credit carryovers allocated to 33 qualified 
states for 2020 from the national pool of unused credit authority). 
 182. See generally CORIANNE PAYTON SCALLY, AMANDA GOLD & NICOLE 
DUBOIS, URB. INST., THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT: HOW IT WORKS AND 
WHO IT SERVES 4 (2018), 
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On the other hand, participation in the Opportunity Zones 
program is only limited by the necessity of the relevant taxpayers 
having capital gains that they are willing to reinvest in QOZ property.  
The final OZ treasury regulations expanded these opportunities for 
investors by not requiring the netting of gains from the sales of 
certain business assets like real estate or machinery and equipment 
with any losses from such assets.183  Samantha Jacoby of the Center 
on Budget and Policy Priorities noted that the JCT estimates in 2019 
were “nearly double what it estimated in 2018 for this tax break.”184  
Although the JCT estimates this tax incentive as costing on average 
$1.6 billion per year,185 it is very difficult to estimate the future cost of 
forgiving all capital gains tax on the unknown future appreciation of 
the OZ investments.186  As discussed in the Introduction, investors 
who hold their investments for ten years are eligible to exclude any 
post-investment capital gains on their investment.187 
3. Geographic Reach of the LIHTC and OZ Programs 
Like the LIHTC program, the Opportunity Zone tax incentive is 




 183. See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Zones, 85 F.R. 1866, 1869 (Jan. 13, 
2020) (providing “that eligible gains that may be deferred pursuant to section 1400Z-
2(a)(1)(A) and the section 1400Z-2 regulations include gains from the sale or 
exchange of property described in section 1231(b) . . . (qualified section 1231 gains), 
regardless of whether section 1231(a) . . . would determine those gains to be capital or 
ordinary in character”). 
 184. Samantha Jacoby, Final Opportunity Zone Rules Could Raise Tax Break’s 
Cost, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y. PRIORITIES (Feb. 3, 2020, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/final-opportunity-zone-rules-could-raise-tax-breaks-cost 
[https://perma.cc/VVY2-FTN2] (“The final regulations’ investor-friendly rule changes 
create the potential for opportunity zones’ costs to go even higher than current 
estimates — with no guarantee that low-income areas, or their residents, will 
benefit.”); see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF 
FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2019-2023 24 (Comm. Print 2019) 
(estimating a cost of $13.7 billion for the years 2019–2022). 
 185. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL 
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2019–2023 30 (Comm. Print 2019). 
 186. See Lester et al., supra note 142, at 229 (noting that “[t]o the extent that there 
is a large and enthusiastic response to this incentive by investors, the costs of the 
forgone tax revenue because of reduced capital gains could be much higher”); see 
also Samantha Jacoby, Potential Flaws of Opportunity Zones Loom, as Do Risks of 
Large-Scale Tax Avoidance, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 11, 2019), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/potential-flaws-of-opportunity-zones-
loom-as-do-risks-of-large-scale-tax [https://perma.cc/3VHR-XST3]. 
 187. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(c) (excluding all post-investment capital gains after ten 
years). 
1098 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
designated Opportunity Zones.188  Governors were able to designate 
25% of their eligible tracts as Opportunity Zones.189  A census tract 
not meeting the definition of a low-income community was still 
eligible for OZ designation if the census tract bordered a designated 
low-income Opportunity Zone and the median family income was not 
in excess of 125% of that of the bordering, low-income community.190  
Two hundred thirty of the designated OZ census tracts are such 
contiguous tracts.191  Although the states selected the Opportunity 
Zones, the federal nature of the tax incentive program “forces 
distressed communities to compete for investment with non-
distressed communities both locally and nationally.”192  As the West 
Baltimore case study lamented, “if the playing field is West Baltimore 
against gentrifying Brooklyn or [downtown] Portland, West 
Baltimore isn’t happening.”193 
In fact, evidence from the Kennedy-Wheeler study shows that most 
qualified opportunity funds are being invested in just 16% of the 
designated Opportunity Zones; 84% of the eligible census tracts 
received no investment in 2019.194  Furthermore, most OZ investors 
are making equity and property investments in those designated 
census tracts “with relatively higher educational attainment, incomes, 
home values,” and pre-existing income and population growth as well 
as “declining shares of elderly and non-white residents.”195  This 
 
 188. BRETT THEODOS, BRADY MEIZELL & CARL HEDMAN, URB. INST., DID STATES 
MAXIMIZE THEIR OPPORTUNITY ZONE SELECTIONS?: ANALYSIS OF OPPORTUNITY 
ZONE DESIGNATIONS 1 (2018) [hereinafter THEODOS ET AL., DID STATES 
MAXIMIZE?], 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98445/did_states_maximize_their
_opportunity_zone_selections_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/6888-HZY7] (“April 20, 2018, 
was the final deadline for governors (and the mayor of the District of Columbia) to 
select which among the roughly 56 percent of eligible census tracts should be 
classified as Opportunity Zones.”). 
 189. See id. (“[O]r at least 25 tracts in states with fewer than 100 qualified 
tracts . . . .”). 
 190. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(e)(1). 
 191. See THEODOS ET AL., DID STATES MAXIMIZE?, supra note 188, at 1–2 (2.6% of 
all designated tracts). 
 192. Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 32–33. 
 193. Id. at 35 (quoting an interviewee who works in banking, fund management, or 
business). 
 194. See Kennedy & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 9–10 (observing $18.9 billion of 
aggregate OZ investments from electronic filers of IRS Form 8996 in tax year 2019). 
The preliminary data does not include paper filings, which account for an estimated 
$6 billion or 25% of OZ investments. See id. at 3. 
 195. Id. at 3–4. But keep in mind that OZ census tracts “are socioeconomically 
disadvantaged relative to eligible-but-not-chosen tracts . . . which are in turn 
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preliminary data appears to echo Professor Michelle Layser’s study of 
the New Market Tax Credit (NMTC) showing that, in many cases, 
NMTC “subsidies have flowed disproportionately to eligible census 
tracts that exhibit signs of gentrification.”196  Layser’s article predicted 
that gentrifying OZ census tracts may similarly draw tax-subsidized 
OZ investment away from other eligible Opportunity Zones.197  The 
Kennedy-Wheeler study provides evidence to support that 
prediction.198 
LIHTC properties located in difficult development areas or 
qualified census tracts are eligible to receive a “basis boost” as an 
incentive for developers to invest in more distressed areas.  In these 
areas, the LIHTC can be claimed for 130% — instead of the normal 
100% — of the project’s eligible basis.199  However, since 2008 the law 
has provided for a discretionary basis boost such that state HFAs may 
treat individual projects “as if” they were in difficult development 
areas if needed for financial feasibility.200  Thus, state HFAs currently 
have “the ability to designate any building, regardless of location, as 
eligible for an enhanced credit” — up to 130% of the building’s 
eligible basis.201  Professor Blaine Saito has expressed concern that 
this bonus has “encourage[d] building in high poverty, high 
segregation, low intergenerationally mobile, low amenity areas like 
the qualified census tracts.”202  In fact, to address this issue, the Biden 
 
disadvantaged relative” to all U.S. census tracts. See id. at 8 tbl. 1 (analyzing 74,001 
census tracts). 
 196. Michelle D. Layser, Subsidizing Gentrification: A Spatial Analysis of Place-
Based Tax Incentives, 12 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 50) 
[hereinafter Layser, Subsidizing Gentrification] (“reveal[ing] that, in most cities, 
NMTC project density [wa]s highest in eligible census tracts that had high vacancy 
rates, increasing rents, or both,” using high vacancy rates and increasing rents as 
evidence of gentrification). 
 197. See id. (manuscript at 50). Layser explains that the results may even be worse 
with respect to the OZ tax incentive program as it lacks any competitive allocation 
process like the one used to administer the NMTC. Because the incentive is designed 
as capital gains relief such that it is most valuable to taxpayers whose assets have 
substantially appreciated, OZ investments are more likely to be profit-driven than 
NMTC investment. Id. (manuscript at 59). 
 198. See Kennedy & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 3. 
 199. See I.R.C. §§ 42(d)(5)(B)(i)–(iii). 
 200. See id. § 42(d)(5)(B)(v). This statute was amended by the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act. See Pub. L. 110-289, § 3003(a), 122 Stat. 2654, 2880 (2008). 
 201. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-66, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX 
CREDITS: AGENCIES IMPLEMENTED CHANGES ENACTED IN 2008, BUT PROJECT DATA 
COLLECTION COULD BE IMPROVED 9 tbl. 2 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-13-
66.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK7M-LXS3]; see also I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B)(v). 
 202. See Blaine G. Saito, Collaborative Governance and the Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit, 39 VA. TAX REV. 451, 487 (2020). 
1100 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
Administration has proposed providing for a 50% basis boost for 
LIHTC developments in Census Tracts of Opportunity (CTO).203  
CTOs are defined as “a tract which is entirely in one or more [difficult 
development areas] or which has low poverty or other advantages.”204 
IV. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY IMPACT 
So, what has been the impact on the local community of the OZ 
investment?  With respect to the Ogden Commons project, new 
construction jobs have been created and the developer has exceeded 
Chicago’s minimums on local hiring preferences by utilizing more 
than 26% of minority business enterprises and more than 6% of 
women business enterprises.205  The tenants of the new commercial 
building will create an estimated 150 jobs.  The Mount Sinai Surgical 
& Ambulatory Care Center will provide greater access to outpatient 
surgical services and will expand their dialysis program as well as 
attempt to remedy some of the health disparities that have been 
highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic.206  The much-needed 
restaurants are all minority-owned and managed and the Wintrust 
Bank branch is also a valued resource for the community.207  Note 
that 5.4% of U.S. residents, approximately 7.1 million households, do 
not have a bank account.208 
For this OZ tax incentive to actually help economically distressed 
communities, there must be an intentional effort for the OZ 
investment to reflect the needs of the residents within these 
designated Opportunity Zones.209  As previously outlined, these OZ 
tax incentives can be taken advantage of “without community input 
or any process of prioritization where local governments can ensure 
alignment with localized goals.”210  However, the residential phase of 
the Ogden Commons project will likely be successful because of the 
community benefit requirements of the LIHTC program including 
 
 203. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2022 REVENUE PROPOSALS 25 (2021), 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/General-Explanations-FY2022.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4VLF-8MDB]. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Telephone Interview with Jeff Head, supra note 129. 
 206. SHS Press Release, supra note 43. 
 207. See Serlin, supra note 68; Koziarz, supra note 69. 
 208. How America Banks: Household Use of Banking and Financial Services, FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/household-
survey/index.html [https://perma.cc/8DNX-92GW]. 
 209. See Layser et al., supra note 26, at 513. 
 210. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 2. 
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the requirement of a qualified allocation plan that reflects the housing 
needs of the relevant community.  Furthermore, a typical 100-unit 
LIHTC property, in its first year, on average, provides $7.9 million in 
additional local income and supports 122 additional jobs.211 
The commercial building of the Ogden Commons project is a 
success because of the multiple requirements from the other sources 
of funding that did necessitate community engagement.  The 
partnership with a nonprofit hospital meant that the community’s 
health needs had been assessed and that a plan to address those needs 
had been developed with community stakeholders.212  The 
partnership with the Chicago Housing Authority also necessitated the 
involvement of residents and resident organizations in the planning, 
development, and construction process, requiring “careful 
consideration to residents’ suggestions.”213 
In order to improve the respective neighborhoods, the OZ tax 
incentive must incorporate some type of procedure for screening 
projects and some type of approval process must be “required by an 
administering agency with expertise in the development of low-
income communities.”214  As Professor Brandon Weiss has astutely 
stated “merely parking capital near poverty will not solve deeply 
entrenched social issues of poverty and racial inequity.”215  One such 
proposal advocates “competitively award[ing] grants to certified 
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) and 
qualified nonprofit housing organizations that partner with qualified 
opportunity funds to develop affordable housing.”216  The Treasury 
Department’s CDFI Fund217 “would allocate these grants through a 
 
 211. See COHNREZNICK LLP, supra note 145, at 6 (noting that each year “the 
housing tax credit program finances the construction or rehabilitation of 
approximately 100,000 units of affordable housing that support roughly 96,000 jobs 
and generate $3.5 billion in tax revenue”). 
 212. See supra note 71 (noting that the ACA of 2010 requires tax-exempt hospitals 
to conduct a CHNA and CHIP every three years); see also SINAI 2019 CHNA, supra 
note 42, at 18. 
 213. Redevelopment Contract, supra note 57, at 15. 
 214. See Layser et al., supra note 26, at 513. 
 215. Weiss, supra note 161 (“And it may in fact exacerbate the problem.”). 
 216. Layser et al., supra note 26, at 513. Certified CDFIs are community lenders 
that serve low-income communities and often provide funding for affordable housing 
developments. See CDFI Certification: Your Gateway to the CDFI Community, 
CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/sites/cdfi/files/documents/
cdfi_program_fact_sheet_certification_updatedjan2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9CP-
JKPL] (last visited Sept. 21, 2021). 
 217. “The CDFI Fund was created for the purpose of promoting economic 
revitalization and community development through investment in and assistance to 
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs).” About Us, CMTY. DEV. 
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competitive application process to certified CDFIs or qualified 
nonprofits with an affordable housing mission that are able to partner 
with a QOF on an affordable housing project” or a mixed-use project 
such as the Ogden Commons project.218  This program could be 
structured very similarly to the CDFI Fund’s Capital Magnet Fund 
that competitively “award[s] grants to finance affordable housing” 
programs in low-income communities nationwide.219 
Other scholars have also suggested involving CDFIs in the OZ tax 
incentive.220  For example, an Urban Institute study recommended 
redesigning the OZ incentive to “encourage equity investments in 
CDFIs who set up QOFs.”221  In addition, Professor Layser has 
identified several barriers that need to be overcome for nonprofits to 
successfully participate in Opportunity Zone deals.222 
Partnering a QOF with a certified CDFI or qualified nonprofit 
would hopefully steer some of the estimated $75 billion of QOF 
equity into sorely needed community development projects in truly 
economically distressed Opportunity Zones in lieu of the luxury 
housing and hotel projects that have tainted the Opportunity Zone 
program’s reputation.223  Involving CDFIs or qualified nonprofits will 
increase the likelihood that these expenditures will support activities 
that are the most needed post-pandemic such as additional 
 
FIN. INST. FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/about/Pages/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/J8D5-HHGV]. 
 218. Layser et al., supra note 26, at 513–14. 
 219. Capital Magnet Fund, CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, 
https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/Programs/cmf/Pages/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/FJ9K-JJUG] (last visited Sept. 21, 2021); see also Capital Magnet 
Fund: Solutions for Affordable Housing in Low-Income Communities, CMTY. DEV. 
FIN. INST. FUND (2020), [https://perma.cc/S8KP-VKPW]. 
 220. CHARLES TANSEY & MICHAEL SWACK, UNIV. OF N.H., CARSEY SCH. OF PUB. 
POL’Y, THE POTENTIAL ROLE FOR CDFIS IN OPPORTUNITY ZONES (2019), 
https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1362&context=carsey 
[https://perma.cc/ZAL3-FQXH]; see also Layser et al., supra note 26, at 513–14 
(outlining the role that CDFIs play with respect to the New Market Credits 
program); Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 32 (noting that “[a]ll study 
participants believed that CDFIs should be better integrated into and supported by 
OZ”). 
 221. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 36. 
 222. See Layser et al., supra note 26, at 473; see also Layser, Nonprofit 
Participation, supra note 132 (manuscript at 35–36) (“identif[ying] several barriers, 
including the requirement that Opportunity Funds make equity investment, the 
absence of monetization structures, and uncertainty about how the investments will 
be treated under the CRA”). 
 223. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE IMPACT OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES: AN 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT, 4 (2020) (estimating that qualified opportunity funds raised $75 
billion in private capital by the end of 2019). 
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interventions to increase the supply of affordable housing and to 
address the challenges associated with vacant properties.224  To ensure 
that the benefits of these interventions flow to neighborhood 
residents and not just the investors, the OZ reforms should also limit 
the subsidies to affordable housing development or economic 
development that will directly benefit community residents.225 
CONCLUSION 
 News articles have reported that the OZ tax incentive is driving 
billions of investment profits into projects such as luxury apartments, 
hotels, student housing, and storage facilities.226  Others criticize that 
OZ funding is flowing into projects already underway227 or in 
“neighborhoods that were already gentrifying.”228  The West 
 
 224. See Layser et al., supra note 26, at 467–68, 512. 
 225. Id. at 512–13. “[B]ecause opportunity zone investments are not required to 
demonstrate specific benefits to the local population, investors may select projects 
based solely on their financial return, with little local social impact.” Lester et al., 
supra note 142, at 229. 
 226. See, e.g., Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor 
Communities Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZH6K-RT5V] (noting that OZ investors minimize risk by investing 
in high-end assets with little benefit going to the community); see also Mark A. 
Pinsky & Keith Mestrich, Opinion, Opportunity Zones Are All Sizzle, Fizzle and the 
Abuse of Good Intentions, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 22, 2019, 4:20 PM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/opportunity-zones-are-all-sizzle-fizzle-and-the-
abuse-of-good-intentions-2019-10-08 [https://perma.cc/4UYE-KY4P] (“The results to 
date show that the outcomes are more likely to be luxury apartments and sparse jobs, 
not affordable housing and employment opportunities.”); Justin Elliott, Jeff 
Emthausen & Kyle Edwards, A Trump Tax Break to Help the Poor Went to a Rich 
GOP Donor’s Superyacht Marina, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 14, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/superyacht-marina-west-palm-beach-opportunity-
zone-trump-tax-break-to-help-the-poor-went-to-a-rich-gop-donor 
[https://perma.cc/ZQ5C-DCSV] (revealing how a major donor’s appeal to Florida 
Governor Scott resulted in an OZ designation that included a marina owned by this 
donor). 
 227. See Alex Nitkin, How a $2B Redevelopment Site in Chicago Landed in a 
Federal Opportunity Zone: A TRD Investigation, REAL DEAL (May 1, 2019, 9:00 
AM), https://therealdeal.com/chicago/2019/05/01/how-a-2b-redevelopment-site-in-
chicago-landed-in-an-opportunity-zone-a-trd-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/VSC5-
X8J5]. The West Baltimore “study participants expect future investments to follow 
the pattern of investments to date, supporting development that would have 
happened without OZ.” Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 12. 
 228. Layser, Subsidizing Gentrification, supra note 196 (manuscript at 3 & n.6) 
(“[G]entrifying census tracts had a 19 percent chance of receiving Opportunity Zone 
designation.”); see also Kelsi M. Borland, Many Opportunity Zones Are Already 
Gentrified, GLOBEST (Feb. 14, 2019, 4:00 AM), 
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Baltimore study observed that 65% of all the OZ capital flowing into 
Baltimore is concentrated “into one gentrified census tract, Port 
Covington, where a $5.5 billion project was already underway.”229  
The evidence is mixed in terms of the OZ tax incentive “making 
projects work that would not otherwise happen” with some 
developers reporting “a decisive difference in allowing a project to go 
forward, while others were clear that their project would have 
proceeded with or without OZ equity.”230 Other studies have found 
that the lack of an upfront federal, state, or local government review 
process is facilitating abuse of this tax expenditure.231 
Although the program was intended to be national in scope, the 
preliminary 2019 data confirm that distribution of the investment 
capital has been driven by market forces to just 16% of the 
designated Opportunity Zones, those that were already experiencing 
gentrification at the expense of the other 84% of the OZs that 
received no investment.232  Furthermore, most OZ investment is 
concentrated in those tracts where population, educational 
attainment, incomes, and home values are increasing while the 
proportion of elderly and non-white residents is declining.233  Reforms 
must be made to the OZ tax incentive to ensure that the types and 
locations of the projects are consistent with the goal of improving 
local economic conditions. 
The U.S. Impact Investing Alliance and the Beeck Center for 
Social Impact and Innovation at Georgetown University have set 
forth guiding principles for Opportunity Zone investors in the hopes 
of “ensur[ing] positive economic and social outcomes for all 




 229. Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 11. 
 230. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 4–5. 
 231. See id. at 2 (noting “that incentives can be accessed without community input 
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principle requires that Opportunity Fund “managers integrate the 
needs of local communities into the formation and implementation of 
the funds, reaching low-income and underinvested communities with 
attention to diversity.”235  However, these principles are voluntary 
and the structure of the OZ tax incentive encourages contrary results. 
Given that the largest tax benefit comes from investing in property 
that is most likely to garner future appreciation, OZ investment 
gravitates toward commercial real estate investments in the least risky 
neighborhoods.  Those who take the least risk or get lucky are the 
most rewarded.236  The possibility of community benefit must not be 
left to chance.  It must be an intentional part of the OZ tax incentive 
tool, especially given the magnitude of the taxpayer revenue foregone 
and the incidence of the tax benefit on the wealthy.  It is not 
appropriate for tax expenditures to be funding investments that do 
not benefit the residents of those Opportunity Zones. 
This Ogden Commons case study has demonstrated the benefit of 
community engagement that came about because of the involvement 
of a nonprofit organization and other mission-driven investors.  It 
does not appear that the OZ tax incentives are a strong enough 
incentive alone for mission-driven projects.  Social impact projects 
like Ogden Commons require many layers of subsidy.  This project 
only worked due to the investment by anchor institutions such as 
Mount Sinai Hospital, the City of Chicago, the Chicago Housing 
Authority, and the state of Illinois as well as a CRA-motivated 
investor such as PNC Bank.  The OZ tax incentive was helpful with 
respect to the commercial real estate phase of the Ogden Commons 
project, financing over 50% of the commercial building.  However, 
OZ funding played no role in the affordable housing phases of the 
project.  Instead, the developers are relying on tax-exempt financing, 
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4% as well as 9% LIHTCs, and other Illinois-specific grants and tax 
incentives. 
This Article also advocates for the involvement of CDFIs in this 
place-based tool to help distressed communities.  The Ogden 
Commons case study and Professor Layser’s Essay have respectively 
demonstrated the benefits and the necessity of involving nonprofit 
organizations.  The entire Opportunity Zone tool must be 
reexamined to determine precisely what result is intended with this 
major investment of taxpayer dollars.  Reforms to the structural 
design of the OZ tool are necessary to ensure that this investment 
pays off. 
 
